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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2010, Section 3022 of the Patient Protection & 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA) established the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program (MSSP).  The MSSP depends on 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate care for large 
groups of Medicare beneficiaries and reduce their overall costs while 
maintaining quality.1  ACOs are a critical part of the PPACA.  If they 
succeed, they could be a model of care coordination critical to cost 
reductions, quality improvements, and expanded access to care both 
within and beyond the Medicare program.2  Their failure would not 
bode well for the wide array of pilot programs promoted and funded 
by the PPACA.3 
Seton Hall was the first law school to host a conference on 
 
 *  Schering-Plough Professor of Health Care Finance and Regulation, Seton Hall 
Law School.  I would like to thank Gianna Cricco-Lizza, Temi Kolarova, and other 
members of the Law Review for their excellent work on the symposium.  Professors 
John Jacobi and Kathleen Boozang were also invaluable to planning the event.  
Deans Rosa Alves-Ferreira and Denise Pinney also offered invaluable contributions to 
our planning and organization. 
 1  Jenny Gold, FAQ On ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER 
HEALTH NETWORK (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011 
/January/13/ACO-accountable-care-organization-FAQ.aspx. 
 2  Maulik Joshi, American Hospital Association, Accountable Care Organizations 
AHA Research Synthesis Report, American Hospital Association Committee on 
Research, (June 2010), available at http://www.hret.org/accountable/resources 
/ACO-Synthesis-Report.pdf; Accountable Care Organizations (ACO): What’s an ACO?, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/ACO/index.html. 
 3  For a discussion of pilot programs’ importance to health care, see Frank 
Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information-
Forcing Regulatory Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).  For an accessible account 
of the role of pilot programs in PPACA, see Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, THE NEW 
YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, at 34, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009 
/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande. 
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ACOs.  We planned the conference in early 2011, as excitement 
about ACOs was building in much of the policy community.  
Moreover, we felt that whatever happened to the ACA in the 
Supreme Court, the organizational forms suggested by the PPACA 
regarding ACOs were influencing private sector players.  Providers, 
insurers, and employers were increasingly coordinating to deal with 
cost and quality concerns. 
On March 31, 2011, the proposed rule guiding providers on the 
establishment of ACOs was released.4  The negative industry response 
was nearly immediate: providers felt that they were being asked to 
move too fast and aggressively on a wide variety of initiatives.  For 
example, merely developing IT systems to keep track of the sixty-five 
quality performance standards needed to qualify for shared savings 
payments seemed daunting.  Keeping up with the “meaningful use” 
rulemakings guiding American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA) subsidies for electronic health records (EHRs) was hard 
enough; now a whole other program was affecting recordkeeping.  
While federal policymakers had assumed there would be synergies 
between ACO establishment and a larger health information 
technology (HIT) revolution,5 providers felt they were being asked to 
do too much, too soon.  Industry resistance left us wondering if the 
conference might be rendered irrelevant due to lack of provider 
interest in establishing ACOs.  The MSSP is an incentive program, 
not a mandate: the private sector must choose to participate if it is to 
be effective. 
We should not have worried.  The idea of accountable care 
proved attractive to private insurers, regardless of its fate at the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  And by the time 
of the conference, the regulatory treatment of ACOs had bent toward 
 
 4  Jordan Rau, Phil Galewitz & Bara Vaida, New ACO Rules Outline Gains And Risks 
For Doctors, Hospitals, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/March/31/ACO-rules.aspx; U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET: ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: 
IMPROVING CARE COORDINATION FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE (Mar. 31, 2011), available 
at  http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/~/media/Files/2011/HHS%20ACO 
%20Overview%20Fact%20Sheet%2033111.pdf; CMS OFFICE OF MEDIA AFF., FACT 
SHEET: SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RULE PROVISIONS FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM (Mar. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/~/media/Files/2011/CMS%20ACO 
%20Fact%20Sheet%20%20Summary%20Proposed%20Rule%20110331.pdf. 
 5  See, e.g., Bob Spoerl, 6 Steps to Building an ACO’s Health IT Capacity, BECKER’S 
HOSP. REV., June 15, 2012, available at http://www.beckershospitalreview.com 
/hospital-physician-relationships/6-steps-to-building-an-acos-health-it-capability.html. 
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provider demands.  Hospitals and doctors successfully demanded key 
changes to the regulatory template.  Industry, HHS, and CMS were 
soon singing from the same hymnal.6  The final rule only imposed 
thirty-three quality measures, and gave other concessions to those 
forming ACOs.  By the time our conference occurred on October, 28, 
2011, ACOs were again a buzzword in health policy, both as specific 
description related to the MSSP and as a larger catchall term for 
trends in health care organization and finance. 
The pas de deux between business and government over ACOs 
had a larger significance for administrative law scholarship.7  From 
the time of its passage in 2010 to the climactic Supreme Court ruling 
in NFIB v. Sebelius, prominent attacks on PPACA have come almost 
entirely from the right on the political spectrum.  The rhetoric of the 
“constitution in exile” succeeded both in empowering states to resist 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and influencing the Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence of the Court.8  But the individual mandate 
survived, as Congress’s power to tax prevented the four justices in the 
joint dissent from using nonseverability doctrine to sweep the ACA 
from American law forever. 
Now that the ACA is to be implemented in earnest, we should 
expect to hear more critiques of it from the left.  Focused on the 
ethics and effectiveness of leading providers and insurers, these are 
the critiques most relevant to ACOs.  For ACOs to work, many large 
corporate enterprises will need to delicately balance the interests of 
 
 6  Mark McClellan (George W. Bush’s CMS Director) and Elliott Fisher sang its 
praises in Health Affairs.  See Mark McClellan and Elliott Fisher, The ACO Final Rule: 
Progress Toward Better Care At Lower Cost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/10/21/the-aco-final-rule-progress-toward-better-
care-at-lower-cost/; Mark McClellan, Aaron N. McKethan, Julie L. Lewis, Joachim 
Roski & Elliott S. Fisher, A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into Practice, 29(5) 
HEALTH AFF. 982 (2010). 
 7  The relative power of business and government in common collaborations has 
been a frequent topic of inquiry, particularly in agencies regulating competition.  
The competing imperatives of recognizing business needs, while avoiding corporatist 
overidentification of state and corporate interests, are a recurring theme in 
administrative law.  See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Indecopi as Brand and Holding Company: 
The Business Model of Governance, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN COMPETITION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS AN ACADEMIC AUDIT OF 
INDECOPI 91 (Beatriz Boza, ed., 2000) (describing the tensions in a competition law 
regulator). 
 8  The anti-ACA decision became a staple of conservative jurisprudence despite 
challenging what many commentators believed to be settled law.  See Mark A. Hall, 
Judge Vinson’s Tea Party Manifesto, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/01/judge-vinsons-tea-party-
manifesto.html. 
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patients and service providers.9  Will they truly maintain quality, or 
game indicators of quality?  Will cost-savings come at the expense of 
patient care?  Where are the real opportunities to improve outcomes, 
and what is mere gaming?10  Responsive regulation will need to 
answer all these questions, and many more, as ACO implementation 
continues. 
This introductory essay describes the academic and regulatory 
agenda for ACOs, and the way our conference authors clarified it.  
Part II describes the rationale of the ACA in general and the ACO 
program in particular.  Part III explains the left critique of the ACA, 
and how the ACO program provides a good test case for whether the 
ACA’s model of corporate-government cooperation can actually 
improve outcomes and reduce costs.  Part IV summarizes the 
positions of our conference speakers.  Part V concludes. 
II. ACOS IN THE ACA 
Critics of the ACA have frequently complained that the 
legislation does not do enough to improve quality or to cut costs.  
However, the Act did create incentives for ACOs to challenge 
traditional health care regulatory models.  Elliott Fisher, director of 
the Center for Health Policy Research at Dartmouth Medical School, 
describes the “three key attributes” of ACOs: “organized care, 
performance measurement, and payment reform.”11 
Fisher has argued that insurers are not well-positioned to 
improve the quality of health care because they “have largely focused 
on negotiating favorable prices within relatively open networks of 
providers” instead of trying to improve the health care their members 
received.12  He believes that a “virtual network” of physicians could do 
a better job, if they teamed up with hospitals.  An “accountable care 
 
 9  See Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/21health.html. 
 10  David Whelan, How Cherry Picking Could Hurt Obama’s Health Care Plan, FORBES, 
July 13, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0713/health-obama-insurance-
hmo-cherry-picking.html (discussing possibilities for gaming the system). 
 11  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended 
Hospital Medical Staff, 26(1) HEALTH AFF. w44 (2007), available at  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w44.full. 
 12  Id.  Private insurers have little incentive to keep current subscribers healthy 
over the long term, since at least half of subscribers on average churn into different 
plans within three years of signing up with a given plan.  See Randall D. Cebul et al., 
Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System, 22(4) J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93 (2008), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi= 
10.1257/jep.22.4.93. 
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organization” is really a legal network, with certain members and 
entities entitled to receive payments in exchange for cutting costs or 
improving quality. 
In an ACO, an “extended hospital medical staff” (or “a hospital-
associated multi-specialty group practice”) can join forces with a 
hospital and agree to be compensated via a lump sum payment.  If 
the group manages to keep overall costs beneath the lump sum 
payment, it can share the gains among its members. Each part of the 
team also has an incentive to work together to keep those they care 
for healthy.  In an ideal world, the ACO responds to concerns about 
fragmentation raised by several health law experts.13 
For ACO proponents, virtual networks of physicians and 
hospitals may provide efficiency and quality gains.  However, there 
are many skeptics.  Jeff Goldsmith worries about shadowy new 
pressures on providers that patients won’t be aware of: 
Consumers would not be aware that they were being treated 
by ACOs.  Rather, they would be “attributed” to them: 
virtual patients of virtual organizations. Aggregate health 
spending for attributed patients would be tracked, and 
increases in that spending would be capped using a form of 
“shadow capitation.”  ACOs that lived within the caps would 
get their fees increased.  Those that overspent would see 
their fees reduced or frozen.14 
Robert Pear has reported that a “frenzy of mergers involving 
hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings” 
worries consumer advocates and antitrust scholars.15  “The new law is 
already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures and alliances 
in the health care industry,” according to Prof. Thomas L. Greaney, 
an expert on health and antitrust law who spoke at Seton Hall’s ACO 
Conference.16  As Greaney puts it, “[t]he risk that dominant providers 
 
 13  See the essays in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND 
SOLUTIONS (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
 14  Jeff Goldsmith, The Accountable Care Organization: Not Ready for Prime Time, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/08/17 
/the-accountable-care-organization-not-ready-for-prime-time/. 
 15  Pear, supra note 9 (“In an environment where health care providers are 
financially rewarded for keeping costs down,” [a lawyer for the Consortium for 
Citizens with Disabilities] said, “anyone who has a disability or a chronic condition, 
anyone who requires specialized or complex care, needs to worry about getting 
access to appropriate technology, medical devices and rehabilitation.  You don’t want 
to save money on the backs of people with disabilities and chronic conditions.”). 
 16  Thomas Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations: A New New Thing with Some Old 
Problems, 10 HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK 6 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679492; Thomas Greaney, 
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and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individually 
or jointly, has never been greater.”17 
ACOs also implicate fraud and abuse laws, since anti-kickback 
and other prohibitions can hamstring efforts to create relevant 
financial incentives.  At a recent government workshop on ACOs, 
participants addressed “circumstances under which collaboration 
among independent health care providers in an ACO permits ACO 
providers to engage in joint price negotiations with private payers 
without running the risk of engaging in illegal price fixing under the 
antitrust laws.”18  HHS also explored “the different ways in which the 
Secretary may exercise waiver authority or create new exceptions and 
safe-harbors related to the physician self-referral law, the Anti-
kickback statute and the CMP law in order to encourage the creation 
and development of ACOs.”19  The American Medical Association 
(AMA) has pushed for “explicit exceptions to the antitrust laws” for 
participating doctors.20  The president of the Federation of American 
Hospitals says “the fraud and abuse laws should be waived 
altogether.”21 
Some scholars may share that skeptical view of fraud and abuse 
laws, at least as they pertain to the types of economic transactions 
 
The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811 
(2011).  See also Cory Capps, PhD & David Dranove, PhD, Market Concentration of 
Hospitals (June 2011), available at http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-Consolidation-
Final.pdf. 
 17  Greaney quoted in Pear, supra note 9.  It is hard to read Greaney’s work on 
the topic without concluding that a toxic mix of “doctrinal shortcomings, political 
pressures, and institutional constraints” have severely compromised antitrust 
enforcement already.  Greaney’s 2004 article on antitrust in health care, Chicago’s 
Procrustean Bed, also suggests that health care antitrust has, for years, been biased 
“strongly [in] favor of defendants” due to the persistent failures of Chicago-inspired 
doctrine to reflect “market imperfections” in health care.  There have been some 
recent wins for federal enforcers against certain major mergers, but the overall 
record of the past two decades has been one of consolidation.  See, e.g., Joe White, 
Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 85(3) MILLBANK QUARTERLY 
143 (2007) (“Hospital managers consolidated systems in order to strengthen their 
bargaining power with insurers, and studies show that consolidation did indeed 
enable hospitals to extract higher-than-average price increases.”). 
 18  Agenda, Workshop Regarding Accountable Care Organizations, and Implications 
Regarding Antitrust, Physician Self-Referral, Anti-Kickback, and Civil Monetary Penalty 
(CMP) Laws, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment 
/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/100510_Meeting_Agenda.pdf 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Pear, supra note 9. 
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necessary to make ACOs work.  Over the past twenty years, regulation 
of fraud and abuse has waxed and waned.  In 1996, James F. 
Blumstein concluded that “the modern American healthcare industry 
is akin to a speakeasy—conduct that is illegal is rampant and 
countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law is so out 
of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the 
marketplace.”22  Nevertheless, as Joan Krause has shown, there are 
important public purposes behind these laws.23  It is therefore 
troubling to see a hospital leader advocate for them to be swept away 
tout court in the case of ACOs.  Policymakers should also be cautious 
about granting overly broad antitrust exemptions to ACOs in a field 
where competition law’s prerogatives have already been whittled 
away.24 
Legal scholar Kevin Werbach once observed that the Internet 
has been centripetal, “pull[ing] itself together as a coherent whole.”25  
For Werbach, network formation theory both explains these 
centripetal tendencies, and some of “the pressures threatening to 
pull the Internet apart” into balkanized units.26  Werbach counsels 
that governments need to “catalyz[e] network formation, and 
moderat[e] the forces that push towards excessive concentration of 
power.”27  These recommendations should also govern new efforts to 
create “virtual networks” of care in the wake of the ACA.  Like many 
forms of network power, the ACOs could quickly have negative 
unintended consequences if regulators fail to anticipate the ways they 
 
 22  Jonathan Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Healthcare 
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 207 (1996).  Gray 
areas in the law remain a problem; see, e.g., Jean M. Mitchell, The Prevalence of 
Physician Self-Referral Arrangements After Stark II, 26(3) HEALTH AFF. W415 (April 2007). 
 23  Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 240 (2004). 
 24  Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices, AMERICA’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PLAN COVERAGE (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/fact-
check-provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/.  An alternative is to start regulating 
dominant ACOs as veritable health care utilities, as critical to regional infrastructure 
as roads, electricity, or water.  See Frank Pasquale, The Limits of Competition, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 26, 2009), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/10/the-limits-of-competition-
and-the-rebirth-of-the-public-option.html.  The logic of concentration seems 
inevitable in the field: insurers and providers have long been in an arms race for 
bargaining power, and as soon as one side gets permission to merge or acquire, the 
other clamors for it. 
 25  Kevin D. Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, 
and the Forces Tearing it Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 343 (2009). 
 26  Id. at 345. 
 27  Id. at 346. 
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could be abused.28  ACOs may work, but only if policymakers can 
replace classic instruments of health care regulation with calibrated 
financing decisions that reflect new industry realities. 
III. SITUATING ACOS: COOPTATION, CAPITULATION, OR COOPERATION 
BY DOMINANT PROVIDERS? 
The history of American health care is littered with cost 
reduction ideas that ran into the buzz saw of quality concerns, 
provider resistance, or patient rebellion.29  While capitation promised 
to incentivize cost discipline, the many health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) charged with implementing the concept faced 
a backlash in the 1990s as they attempted to implement aggressive 
utilization review.30  More recently, the less controversial ideas behind 
gainsharing ran into a number of legal obstacles.31 
The ACA has emphasized ACOs as both a more and less 
ambitious form of cost cutting.  Implemented as part of a Medicare 
Shared Savings Program,32 ACOs are networks of providers and/or 
 
 28  See Frank Pasquale, Network Power: Forced and Free, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 
27, 2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/05/network_power_ 
f.html; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 Hastings L. J. 1441, 1453–54 (observing mechanisms for the 
abuse of networks). 
 29  GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2010); Frank Pasquale, The 
Hippocratic Math: How Much Should Society Spend on Health Care?, 32(4) JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL MEDICINE 529 (2012) (reviewing GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH 
(2010)) (critiquing some cost reduction efforts). 
 30  Thomas H. Greaney, Managed Care: From Hero to Goat, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
217, 217. (2003); Joe White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993–2005, 
85(3) MILBANK QUARTERLY (2007) (“Utilization reductions were part of the reason 
that cost increases slowed in the mid-1990s.  Group/staff HMOs certainly did reduce 
hospitalization rates.  Moreover, health insurers did retreat from many of the 
methods of utilization controls that they had emphasized in the mid-1990s.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 31  Gainsharing is a financial arrangement that permits physicians to share in the 
savings that result when they alter practice patterns.  Richard S. Saver, Squandering the 
Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 145, 147 (2003).  For example, a group of surgeons may engage in bulk 
purchasing to obtain discounts on surgical equipment, rather than each choosing 
instruments individually.  Start-ups like Groupon and Living Social have exploited 
this savings model, but residual quality concerns have impeded its adoption in health 
care settings.  Some recent pilot programs have indicated the potential for savings 
from gainsharing.  Mike Kalison, Presentation at the Seton Hall Law Review 
Symposium on ACOs (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 32  PPACA § 3022(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 395, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1).  
The term ACO originated in a 2006 exchange.  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating 
Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26(1) HEALTH AFF. 
w44 (2007), available at  http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1 
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hospital(s)33 that are charged with coordinating care for a group of at 
least 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries.34  As of early 2012, HHS had 
already named thirty-two “health care organizations and providers 
that are already experienced in coordinating care for patients across 
care settings” as pioneer ACOs.35  ACOs can be physician-centered, 
hospital-centered, or some combination of the two.36  CMS will 
reward the provision of quality care by giving providers participating 
in the ACO a share of the savings if risk-adjusted, per-beneficiary 
spending levels came in below a benchmark set by the agency at the 
outset.  For example, if benchmark spend were $10,000 apiece for 
10,000 beneficiaries in 2014, and the ACO reduced the spend to 
 
/w44.full.  It is designed to solve a classic “chicken and egg” problem in health care 
reform: whether to start with payment or delivery system reform.  See Kelly Devers & 
Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health Care by 
Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 2009), 
available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/acobrieffinal.pdf, in which the 
authors state that: 
Many believe that to bend the cost curve while improving quality, we 
must reform the provider payment system first, because it pays for 
volume rather than value.  Others hold that it is impossible to change 
the payment system to achieve the desired objectives unless delivery 
system reform first produces organizations capable of handling an 
altered payment system. They point to the need for health care 
professionals, now usually working in separate institutional settings, to 
work collaboratively and to demonstrate their capacity for handling 
new payment approaches. To avoid the quandary of where to start 
first—provider payment or delivery system reform—the ACO concept 
attempts to combine them. 
Id. 
 33  Bruce Merlin Fried et al., Accountable Care Organizations: Navigating the Legal 
Landscape of Shared Savings and Coordinated Care, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 88 (2010) 
(“A wide range of professionals may work together to establish ACOs, including 
physicians in group practice arrangements, networks of individual physician 
practices, hospitals, and partnerships or joint ventures between hospitals and 
physician groups.  ACOs also may include other forms of groups as the HHS 
Secretary (Secretary) deems appropriate.  By forming an ACO, these healthcare 
providers commit to being held accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of 
Medicare beneficiaries.”). 
 34  Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, 
The Concept Is Too Vitally Important To Fail, 30(7) HEALTH AFF. 1250 (2011), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/7/1250.full.  ACOs have also been 
called “amorphous cluster[s] of possible collaborative models,” where hospitals are 
bound to remain central because “the largest avoidable Medicare costs are hospital 
related” and “in many communities, the hospital is the only organized care delivery 
entity capable of executing the model.”  Id. 
 35  Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/pioneer/ (last visited July 12, 2012). 
 36  Physician-centered ACOs could include multispecialty group practices (MSGs) 
and interdependent physician  organizations (IPOs), also known as independent 
practice associations (IPAs). 
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$9,000 while maintaining quality levels, $10 million in savings could 
be attained, some of which would compensate participants in the 
ACO. 
Some may question why ACOs were included in the ACA when 
more direct cost savings (such as direct discouragement of marginally 
effective treatments, or reduced reimbursement levels) are also part 
of the Act.  Part of the answer lies in growing Democratic party 
consensus about government partnering with corporate entities to 
achieve public ends.  There is still a residual divide between “realists” 
in the Democratic party and more idealistic progressives; as Ed 
Kilgore states, “on a widening range of issues, Obama’s critics to the 
right say he’s engineering a government takeover of the private 
sector, while his critics to the left accuse him of promoting a 
corporate takeover of the public sector.”37  But by and large, the 
realists guided the ACA’s drafting.  Opposition to the public option 
became so intense in official Washington (especially among the 
insurance industry-friendly staffers of Senate Finance Chair Max 
Baucus) that those pursuing universal coverage have become 
identified with the very entities they were trying to discipline via 
health insurance exchanges and delivery system reforms.38 
Some political commentators rejected the compromises that 
resulted.  Glenn Greenwald offered a multifaceted indictment of 
Congressional Democrats’ bargains with corporate interests: 
The health care bill is one of the most flagrant 
advancements of . . . corporatism yet, as it bizarrely forces 
millions of people to buy extremely inadequate products 
from the private health insurance industry—regardless of 
whether they want it or, worse, whether they can afford it 
(even with some subsidies). . . . It’s about affirmatively 
harnessing government power in order to benefit and 
strengthen those corporate interests and even merging 
government and the private sector.39 
Only the full implementation of PPACA will allow us to judge 
how serious Greenwald’s concerns are.  Rulemaking on essential 
 
 37  Ed Kilgore, Left-Right Convergence?, DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIST (Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2009/12/leftright_convergence 
.php. 
 38  For background on the public option, see Frank Pasquale, Public Option as 
Private Benchmark, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 9, 2009), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/06/public-option-as-private-
benchmark.html. 
 39  Glenn Greenwald, The Underlying Divisions in the Healthcare Debate, SALON (Dec. 
18, 2009), http://www.salon.com/2009/12/18/corporatism/. 
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health benefits promises to make most insurance products available 
on exchanges adequate.  However, medical loss ratio waivers granted 
to some carriers threaten to hamper the ACA’s effect.40  Moreover, 
affordability is a major concern, especially since the Treasury 
Department ruled that the 9.5%-of-income limit on the costs of 
insurance for those making under 400% of the Federal Poverty Line 
only applies to the cost of a plan for an individual worker, and not for 
his or her family.41 
These developments ensure that a harsh spotlight will be cast on 
ACOs.  Will they successfully meld the best of public values and 
private initiative?  Or will they recapitulate the crony capitalism so 
often identified in the defense and banking sectors?  Often, the very 
interest groups that are supposed to be reined in by pilot programs 
do their best to alter, influence, or limit those programs.  One need 
only look at the convoluted history of gainsharing pilot programs to 
get a sense of how, as the “rubber hits the road,” various lobbies will 
be storming veto points to undermine experimentalists’ efforts.42  
This is not to say that pilot programs are a sham—I’ve published a 
book chapter on pilot programs as information-forcing regulatory 
design, and Mike Kalison’s presentation at the Seton Hall ACO 
Conference demonstrated some very promising results from 
gainsharing studies that finally got off the ground.  I just want to 
temper the technocratic optimism at the heart of progressive 
enthusiasm for the ACA in general, and ACOs in particular. 
Like 2009’s stabilizations of the financial system, the ACA may be 
a Pyrrhic victory for the Democratic Party.  As one strategist put it: “In 
their determination to avoid Harry and Louise, they’ve become 
 
 40  For loopholes, see Frank Pasquale, Consumer Watchdog on Health Reform 
Loopholes, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/consumer-watchdog-on-
health-reform-loopholes.html. 
 41  Judy Solomon, Health Care Coverage Must be Affordable for Families, Too, CTR. FOR 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (July 27, 2012), http://www.offthechartsblog.org 
/health-coverage-must-be-affordable-for-families-too/ (“Treasury’s current 
interpretation of the ACA . . . considers employer coverage affordable for the entire 
family as long as coverage just for the employee costs no more than 9.5 percent of 
the family’s income.  Unfortunately, on average, employer-sponsored health plans 
charge employees more than twice as much for family coverage as individual 
coverage.  Thus, many workers wouldn’t qualify for help buying coverage for their 
family even though the cost of employer-provided family coverage far exceeded the 
ACA’s 9.5 percent affordability threshold.”).  Marco Ferreira has written an 
expanded version of this critique.  Ferreira, Affordability After the ACA, manuscript on 
file with author (2012). 
 42  See Hearing on Gainsharing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
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Thelma & Louise.”43  Although it was a characteristically snide and 
smug observation from inside the Beltway, this bon mot has some 
chance of coming true.  Like most of the conventional wisdom 
excrudescing from pundits, it’s less a reflection of reality than a 
narrative our entrenched political class enacts.  The “politics of 
reform” will be endlessly refracted in D.C. media celebrities’ halls of 
mirrors, where a twenty-four-hour news cycle is always hungry for 
“backlash.”  The lazy conventional wisdom has already coalesced 
around a narrative of Obama-as-Icarus, perpetually mistaking his 
cautious incrementalism as creeping socialism. 
In the culmination of a decades-long struggle for the soul of the 
Democratic party, realists routed idealists during the ACA legislative 
process. They pushed the public option off the table, assuring that 
public-private partnerships like ACOs and insurance exchanges 
would be the ACA’s primary mechanisms for delivering access to 
care.  The sclerotic Senate’s supermajority rules and the 
Congressional Budget Office’s rigid analyses put the realists in the 
driver’s seat, and idealistic progressives were left with little more than 
the power to refuse the bill that Senate centrists crafted.44 
By passing the ACA’s technocratic and business-centered 
solutions, Democrats jettisoned populism for an early-twentieth-
century progressive vision of technocratic alliances between 
corporate and government experts.45  As HHS implements the ACA, 
we are commencing an endless argument (read: notice and comment 
rulemaking and subsequent administrative adjudications) over what 
constitutes an adequate baseline of coverage, what is the fair share of 
revenue for middlemen like insurers, and what regulatory 
infrastructure can best vindicate the entitlements (and impose the 
burdens) specified by the bill.  But the fundamental victory of 
reform—the national commitment that no one should have to 
choose between death or bankruptcy when confronted with a serious 
illness—will also endure.  That commitment will only prove effective, 
 
 43  That’s the verdict on the Obama Administration from a Democratic strategist 
tweeted by horserace reporter extraordinaire, Chris Cillizza, referencing a 90s-era ad 
campaign against the Clinton plan for health reform and a film starring two 
exuberant yet ultimately self-destructive protagonists. 
 44  See Frank Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication at the Congressional Budget Office, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 28, 2009), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-
at-the-congressional-budget-office.html. 
 45  For a discussion of the place of populism and progressivism in American law, 
see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935 
(1995). 
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though, if reforms like ACOs manage to improve quality and access. 
IV. SYMPOSIUM VIEWPOINTS ON THE FUTURE OF ACOS 
ACOs can take a variety of organizational forms, such as 
integrated delivery systems, primary care or multispecialty medical 
groups, hospital-based systems, and contractual or virtual networks of 
physicians such as independent practice associations. Some 
policymakers worry that shared  saving may not adequately motivate 
providers to change long-established customary practices, however 
lacking the evidence base may be for those practices.  One of our 
Symposium contributors, Jessica L. Mantel, complements that worry 
by offering nuanced perspectives based on health services research 
on the interactions between the delivery system and the payment 
system. 
Mantel’s compelling article, Accountable Care Organizations: Can 
We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, sounds a judicious note of caution 
about delivery system innovation.  While ACO proponents have 
offered many excellent ideas for improved health care at lower cost, 
there have been many other historical efforts to trim “fat” and 
improve the treatment of chronic conditions.  ACOs’ political appeal 
may well spell their undoing as a vector of cost containment. 
 Washington “wise men” have long insisted that so much health 
care spending is wasteful, making it possible to cover many more 
individuals and improve quality by cutting out unnecessary care and 
using the savings to purchase productive medical interventions.46  
Indeed, some estimates say that a third of care is wasted.47  However, 
consider what was long said of the advertising industry: half of 
marketing budgets are wasted, the only problem is that we don’t 
know which half.  That may be far less true in an age of targeted 
Google AdWords, but no one has yet succeeded in developing the 
Google of health care.  Mantel takes the humbling logic of 
advertising’s black box to healthcare policy, adducing numerous 
pieces of evidence to demonstrate that it is sometimes very difficult to 
disincentivize unnecessary care without also discouraging needed 
interventions. 
Mantel also reviews the health policy literature to demonstrate 
that the potential cost-savings from better management of patients 
 
 46  Ezra Klein, The Number-Cruncher-in-Chief, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 11, 2008, available 
at http://prospect.org/article/number-cruncher-chief. 
 47  See Rich McManus, Perhaps One-Third of Health Care Spending is Wasted, Says 
Brownlee, NIH RECORD, Apr. 17, 2009, available at 
http://nihrecord.od.nih.gov/newsletters/2009/04_17_2009/story2.htm. 
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with chronic conditions may be lower than ACO proponents 
contend.48  She also doubts that ACOs can do much about long-term 
inflationary pressures from advances in medical technology.  
Avoiding expensive technology without sacrificing quality will prove 
difficult in at least some cases. 
Mantel expertly integrates insights from diverse literatures into 
her contribution to the symposium.  Her work raises larger questions 
for law professors engaging with policy science literatures.  How do 
we assess the validity, replicability, and extrapolability of results?  How 
robust are predictive models?  During the debate on health care 
reform, several experts challenged the Congressional Budget Office’s 
estimates of the overall costs arising out of House and Senate bills.49  
They stated that the CBO’s work was particularly dubious because it 
did not fully take into account the efficiency gains that could arise 
out of synergistically reinforcing delivery system reforms.  Mantel’s 
work gives us some reason to respect CBO’s caution about projecting 
cost savings, however troubling may be the CBO’s neglect of many 
important social values in its calculations. 
Given the extraordinary difficulty of validating long-term cost 
projections, scholars might want to explore other paths forward.  The 
effort will need to begin with humility about the limits and scope of 
quantitative predictions.  For example, George Mason economist 
Russ Roberts has critiqued problems of reliability and replicability in 
social science research in a series of well-regarded interviews with 
leaders in the economics and finance fields.50  In econometrics, Ed 
Leamer has complained for years about problematic analyses.51  Brian 
Nosek has worried that social scientific practices depart so far from 
ideals of science that he is co-authoring a series of articles on 
“scientific utopias” to build support for entirely new modes of open 
 
 48  According to Mantel, studies of both preventative measures and disease 
management programs have repeatedly found that most fail to produce net cost-
savings, and in some cases, the programs even increase health care spending.  Jessica 
Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 42 
SETON HALL. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (2012). 
 49  Michael Ricciardelli, CBO Wrong on Cost Numbers, HEALTH REFORM WATCH 
(Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2009/08/30/cbo-wrong-on-
health-care-reform-cost-numbers/. 
 50  See Roberts’s interviews with Ed Leamer, Nicholas Nassim Taleb, and Brian 
Nosek, available at LIBRARY OF ECONMICS AND LIBERTY, http://www.econtalk.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
 51  Ed Leamer, Let’s Take the ‘Con’ Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31 
(1983), available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/media/files/Leamer_article 
.pdf. 
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research.52  Finally, Victoria Stodden has led an effort toward open 
science that would empower those who rely upon research to review 
the underlying analyses it is based on, and to draw their own 
conclusions.53 
Of course, even if all of these critiques and positive projects 
succeed in better illuminating the data underlying health policy 
analyses and projections, cost benefit analysis may still fail to grasp 
the complex dynamics of health care cost and quality trends.  We 
might expect physicians to engage in various forms of income 
maintenance, whatever plans HHS or state agencies devise.  Squeeze 
the health care cost “balloon” on one side, and it may only bulge out 
somewhere else.54  Given the limits of quantitative projection, we 
need to see more openness to qualitative analysis in the health policy 
arena. 
One promising alternative is “scenario planning,” now common 
in the environmental arena and catching on in business.  Scenario 
planners imagine how a variety of economic, cultural, political, and 
other developments may interact.  As Rob Verchick explains, a more 
comprehensive approach may be the only way to do justice to the 
interactions and unexpected consequences inevitable in a complex 
economy: 
Cost-benefit approaches provide poor measures when they 
depend on forecasting too many long-term and uncertain 
costs. . . . [S]cenario planning broadens knowledge by 
taking a holistic approach to describing circumstances. . . . 
The strong emphasis on narrative allows the technique to 
 
 52  Brian A. Nosek & Yoav Bar-Anan, Scientific Utopia: I. Opening Scientific 
Communication (May 5, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2051047. 
 53  Stodden et al., Reproducible Research, 12 (5) COMPUTING SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING, 8–13 (September/October 2010, doi: 10.1109/MCSE.2010.113.). 
 54  See, e.g., Charles Morris’s statement that: 
There is a strongly held opinion, particularly among conservative think 
tanks, that with multiple competitive private payers, the normal 
interactions between vendors and payers will gradually create a more 
efficient health care system.  I saw no evidence to support that belief.  
What actually happens [at the hospital division he observed was that] 
the billing staff sit down each year; lay out the various payment plans 
on a spreadsheet, and decide on the division strategy—which surgeons 
will join which plans, and which carriers will be carried on a nonplan 
basis, trading higher payments for greater collection risk.  Once that 
strategy is set, it is managed entirely by the collections staff.  The 
surgeons simply join the plans they’re assigned to. 
CHARLES MORRIS, THE SURGEONS 236 (2007). 
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capture a problem in its full complexity.55 
Roger Boesche’s essay, Why Could Tocqueville Predict So 
Well?, describes a similar capability in the great French social theorist.  
As Boesche relates, in Tocqueville’s works, “society is an ‘ensemble’ in 
which the elements are ‘indissolubly united:’” 
[T]he second volume of Democracy in America endeavors to 
demonstrate how language, literature, the relations of 
masters and servants, the status of women, the family, 
property, politics, and so forth, must change and align 
themselves in a new, symbiotic configuration as a result of 
the historical thrust toward equality.56 
Tocqueville’s work focused on the chain reactions of social 
change that occurred as social equality spread. In our own time, we 
need to use similar methods to describe the consequences of a 
historical thrust toward inequality, particularly with respect to the 
health care system.  How might declining income shares for the 
middle and lower classes, and increasing shares for the very wealthy, 
affect providers’ goals and incentives?  As the very top of the income 
scale pulls away from health professionals making, say, $140,000 to 
$800,000 annually, how might these professionals respond to policy 
initiatives that further cut their share of income?57 
For example, one might expect that a consolidation of facilities 
might leave the large players still standing with an opportunity to 
demand more compensation once they are dominant in a given 
health care marketplace.  In her expert analysis of the interaction of 
competition law and ACOs, Tara Ragone tries to assure that proper 
antitrust enforcement against health care titans prevents abusive 
practices, while not inadvertently discouraging innovative service 
provision for providers focused on at-risk populations.  Her article, 
Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations to Avoid Antitrust 
Challenges, focuses on concerns that New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO pilot 
program may trigger federal antitrust concerns.  It will prove useful 
to advisors in any state interested in developing new care models for 
their Medicaid populations. 
There are aspects of the New Jersey Medicaid ACO 
collaborations that some competition law experts may find troubling.  
 
 55  ROBERT VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE 242 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2010). 
 56  Roger Boesche, Why Could Tocqueville Predict So Well?, 11 POLITICAL THEORY 79 
(1983). 
 57  For figures on the relative income gains of the top 1, 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001%, see 
Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS OF HEALTH 
L. 269, 276 (2010). 
PASQUALE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  11:02 AM 
2012] FOREWORD 1387 
For example, only one Medicaid ACO is permitted in each defined 
region, and the ACO must have the support of all the hospitals and at 
least seventy-five percent of the primary care providers in that region.  
New Jersey believes that such stringent requirements are necessary to 
guarantee “clinical integration,” a sine qua non for the price 
improvement and cost cutting that ought to be at the core of 
consumer-oriented antitrust analysis.  “Rule of reason” review for New 
Jersey’s pilot Medicaid Accountable Care Organization 
Demonstration Project58 (“pilot”) seems an appropriately “light 
touch” antitrust doctrine to apply.59 
Sound principles of antitrust law support such a move, since the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
have recognized the potential for clinical integration to boost quality.   
Given the clear legislative intent of the pilot to encourage clinical 
integration in the name of quality improvement at reduced costs, it 
seems likely that the DOJ and FTC will find that the procompetitive 
advantages to consumers of New Jersey’s pilot outweigh its potential 
harm to competition, and that the anticompetitive aspects of the 
collaboration are necessary to realize its benefits.60  All in all, it would 
be a shame to see antitrust law, reduced to a nearly vestigial role in 
many purely profit-maximizing industries, scuttle innovation among 
health care providers who are participating in community-oriented 
initiatives. 
Scenario planning for policy innovation will depend on close 
attention to the “facts on the ground” in different states’ health care 
markets.  Barbara J. Zabawa, Louise G. Trubek & Felice F. Borisy-
Rudin’s article, Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare 
Framework, further confirms the importance of an empirical 
approach.  Zabawa et al. argue that the thought leaders behind ACOs 
 
 58  New Jersey’s Medicaid ACO demonstration project is a three-year pilot to test 
multi-stakeholder, geographic-based Medicaid ACOs. 
 59  See Tara Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations to Avoid 
Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443 (2012).  Antitrust concerns stem 
from the fact that the pilot increases regional coordination and shared 
accountability, which can lead to less competition (integration encourages fewer 
competitors in the markets, which could increase market power).  Even where prices 
are set by the government (Medicare) or effectively capped by government payments 
to HMOs (much of Medicaid), and not subject to being heavily influenced by 
anticompetitive collusion, regulators may worry about non-price elements of 
competition (such as output, quality of services, and innovation). 
 60  According to Ragone, the state has articulated a policy to allow the 
anticompetitive conduct to ensure that the State’s goals, and not simply self-serving 
goals, are furthered, and has suggested a commitment to provide active supervision 
here.  Ragone, supra note 59, at 1462. 
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were cognizant of past failures when designing the Medicare Shared 
Saving Program, addressing the issues raised by such resistance 
movements as the “managed care backlash.”  Zabawa et al. note that 
New Jersey consists of mainly small practices, but despite this 
fragmentation, it witnessed precursors of ACOs.  These included 
collaboratives to improve patient safety in the ICU, and a three-year 
gain-sharing pilot project funded by CMS in 2009. 
A multi-tiered governmental guidance and management 
structure will be necessary to achieve the triple aim of “better health, 
better care, and reduced costs” via ACOs, along with meaningful 
patient engagement.  Zabawa et al.’s story of Wisconsin accountable 
care is richly layered, drawing on the authors’ decades of experience 
practicing and teaching health law there.  They attest that Wisconsin 
has a “rich culture of collaboration” with “prominen[t] integrated 
delivery systems,” and report that many health systems there believe 
that they already provide accountable care.  Their account of the 
Wisconsin Collaborative for Health Care Quality also has important 
lessons for those who will be discussing and implementing ACOs in 
the future.61 
Zabawa et al. believe that accountable care reformers have 
learned from managed care’s difficulties in the 1990s,62 as especially 
evidenced in the concessions made between the proposed and final 
rules on the MSSP.63  They believe that ACOs are building upon the 
success of pilot programs in Wisconsin and New Jersey, and will 
provide effective patient engagement.  Zabawa et al. therefore 
provide targeted, localized evidence that states like New Jersey and 
Wisconsin may be able to overcome the considerable hurdles to 
clinical integration and cost control noted in Mantel’s work. 
The process of clinical integration is not only happening at the 
macro-level with ACOs, but is also moving forward on the micro-level, 
in Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs).  Sallie Thieme 
 
 61  “Each system has strong affiliations or partnerships with at least one hospital; 
all have its own employed physician groups, which includes both primary care and 
specialist; all but two have its own health plan as part of its system; and each has an 
EMR that the system has been using for many years.”  Zabawa et al., Adopting 
Accountable Care Through the Medicare Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471, 1479 
(2012). 
 62  For example, freedom to leave an ACO coupled with the prohibition against 
referrals and financial incentives to entice beneficiaries to remain in the ACO is 
arguably a response to the managed care backlash. 
 63  The MSSP encourages or mandates the use of shared governance, information 
technology, multi-professional practitioners, financial incentives, benchmarks, 
metrics and patient participation; it required population-based accountability, 
coordinated care, quality health care, and efficiency. 
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Sanford’s insightful article, Designing Model Homes for the Changing 
Medical Neighborhood: A Multi-Payer Pilot Offers Lessons for ACO and 
PCMH Construction, takes the construction metaphor for health care 
seriously, and illuminates several important lessons that should guide 
policymakers going forward.  Sanford explains that the PCMH is a 
primary care initiative “not far removed in principle”64 from the ACO 
model; indeed, in some formulations the PCMH is a necessary part of 
any well-functioning ACO.  Sanford reminds us that zoning laws exert 
a powerful influence on the residential and business activity, often in 
unseen ways.  So too can payment systems and regulatory approaches 
influence doctors, patients, and hospitals’ actions, and can motivate 
entirely new forms of care delivery.65 Sanford’s article considers how 
these redesigned “medical homes” could fit into the rezoned “high-
performing medical neighborhoods”66 envisioned by Fisher and 
others. 
As Sanford observes, managed care cut the rate of the health 
care cost growth dramatically, but provoked a backlash when some 
members felt trapped in closed networks of providers.  New programs 
need to be sensitive to these concerns and to build up trust among 
members and providers.  Sanford’s article explains the Washington 
Multi-Payer Medical Home Reimbursement Pilot, a multi-payer 
model which includes additional upfront payments, potential shared 
savings, downside financial risk, and other elements reflective of 
“accountable care.”  This pilot involves most of the state’s major 
insurers in a thirty-two-month project to provide upfront payments 
for enhanced primary care in selected practices.  These practices will 
also see shared saving if there are reductions in ER visits or 
hospitalizations beyond set targets. 
There are some encouraging models here.  Washington’s Group 
Health Cooperative piloted a medical home demo in 2006.  As 
Sanford explains, this project developed patient engagement through 
electronic health records.  It also promoted care plans for the 
 
 64  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 185 (West, 6th ed. Supp. 2011). 
 65  See also Frank Pasquale, The Three Faces of Retainer Care, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 39, 56 (2007) (discussing how interpretations of Medicare and state 
insurance regulations could affect concierge medicine); Frank Pasquale, Ending the 
Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information-Forcing Regulatory 
Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 
235 (Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2010) (discussing the rise of ambulatory 
surgical centers and specialty hospitals in the context of larger changes in the health 
care industry). 
 66  Elliott S. Fisher, Building a Medical Neighborhood for the Medical Home, 359 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1205 (2008). 
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chronically ill, more comprehensive physician visits, routine care-
term “huddles” to review patient needs, and greater involvement by 
nurses, pharmacists, medical assistants (and other physician 
extenders) in coordinating patient care.  Additional costs were 
recouped by significant reduction in ER visits and hospitalizations.  
Also in Washington, the Boeing Intensive Outpatient Care Program 
helped align the incentives of a major self-insured airplane 
manufacturer with employees and providers.  Employees were 
matched with a team of providers who offered health services in a 
medical home model in exchange for their usual fees plus care 
management fees.  The extra fees were a wise investment: the overall 
costs for those employees were twenty percent less than a control 
group. 
The Boeing project and others like it suggest that PCMH models 
function best with upfront funding.  Upfront funding is a feature of  
Washington’s multi-payer, multi-site pilot whichlaunched in May 
2011.  Practice sites in the pilot receive not only their usual fee-for-
service payments, but also a monthly care management fee (CMF).  
This should allow infrastructural investment in care coordination 
(including technology to advance telemedical practice, emails, and 
team meetings) and electronic health records.  Seven health plans 
and eight primary care practices have signed on.  If quality metrics 
are maintained and ER visits and hospitalizations are reduced below 
break-even targets, the practice sites share the financial savings with 
the insurers; if the targets are not met, the practice sites face 
downside financial risk, including a reduced CMF.  This pilot is 
intended to support a broader transformation of the healthcare 
system towards, and Sanford’s article considers the lessons it offers 
for accountable care in general and the PCMH in particular. 
Sanford’s careful research demonstrates that Patient-Centered 
Medical Homes and Accountable Care Organizations may develop 
synergistically, if the right legal, policy, and training frameworks are 
in place. 
Overall, the four articles present invaluable research on the past 
and future of accountable care policy initiatives to achieve the “triple 
aim” of reducing costs, increasing quality, and enhancing access.  
Mantel and Ragone offer wake up calls about the policy and legal 
risks of ACOs.  It’s impossible to read their articles and to come away 
with a sense that the road ahead for accountable care will be easy.  
On the other hand, Zabawa et al. and Sanford have demonstrated 
that in some settings in Washington, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, 
efforts to coordinate care have saved money without negatively 
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impacting patients—and have, on occasion, improved quality as well.  
Political, economic, and medical trends will determine whether 
skepticism or optimism toward ACO’s was the proper mood as of 
2012.  Regardless of what they bring, anyone interested in the future 
of health policy will be richly rewarded by careful reading of these 
articles. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. health care system too often puts profits ahead of 
patients’ interests.67  Economic incentives must become more fine-
tuned. The ACA in general, and ACOs in particular, are worthy 
efforts to offer incentives to improve quality, control costs, and 
expand access.  Panelists at Seton Hall’s ACO conference offered a 
great deal of insight and advice on how best to accomplish those 
goals.68  This volume memorializes notable contributions to this 
important public dialogue. 
 
 
 67  Timothy S. Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on 
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006). 
 68  2011 Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: What Role for Accountable 
Care Organizations?, SETON HALL L. REV. (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://erepository.law.shu.edu/shlr_symposia/2011/. 
